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Abstract. Contactless debit cards are widely used in the UK, slowly becoming
popular in other countries as well. e feature that distinguishes these cards
from regular ones is that they can be used without entering a PIN if the trans-
action amount is below a predetermined limit. is is undeniably convenient,
but introduces a risk: cards could be lost or stolen, and the new holder could
make purchases without providing a PIN. European banking regulations (PSD2)
mandate that customers be fully refunded by their banks in these cases (as long
as no negligence can be proven). While the law is clear regarding liability and
citizens’ actual contactless card risks, we wanted to explore UK citizens’ per-
ceptions in this respect. We conducted an online survey, specically exploring
the perceptions of liability, severity and likelihood of contactless card fraud. We
discovered that participants’ risk perceptions were not aligned with their actual
risk. In particular, most participants assumed that they themselves would be li-
able for any contested transactions. ere are clear lessons to be learned – also
valid for other EU countries – emphasising the need to ensure that consumers
are aware of their rights in this respect.
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1 Introduction
Shoppers can pay for their purchases in a number of ways. Over the last few decades,
the number of card purchases in the UK has gradually overtaken cash, with contactless
purchases dominating, as can be seen in Figure 1. Given that the UK is considered to be
“a mature CHIP and PIN nation” [30], we chose to focus on UK card users to understand
the risk perceptions of regular users.
Perceptions of the risks of traditional payment methods (debit/credit cards, cash)
have been investigated [20, 13, 15], but contactless debit card mental models have re-
ceived less aention. European banking regulations require banks to refund contested
transactions, as long as no negligence can be proven and the PIN was not entered. e
implications for the customer are that use of these cards, contactlessly, is liability free.
Do contactless card holders know this? We carried out a study to gain insights into
UK consumer perceptions of contactless card risks.
Section 2 reviews the risks of card usage. We designed an online study (Section
3) to gain insights into UK contactless card users. Participants were presented with a
2 Aldag et al.
Fig. 1. UK Cash vs. Debit Cards [4], Contactless Usage growth since 2016 (hps://www.statista.
com/statistics/748192/number-of-contactless-transactions-in-the-uk/)
pickpocketing scenario where the victim subsequently notices a number of unautho-
rised transactions on his account. We then asked the participants a range of questions
related to this scenario, with particular focus on liability, severity and likelihood per-
ceptions. We present our ndings in Section 4 and discuss them in Section 5. We review
the literature related to contactless payments in Section 6 before concluding in Section
7.
2 Background
When debit cards were introduced in the UK in 1987, they were a very aractive al-
ternative to cash. It was only during the mid 1990s that they spread throughout UK
society1. e cards themselves were easy to carry and had no intrinsic value. ey
oered bank account holders ready access to their cash reserves, protected by using a
secret PIN, allowing users to safely pay at most points of sale (POS).
Initially, to mitigate the risks of cashless payments, banks required customers to
replicate the signature that appeared on the back of their card every time they used it.
e card’s information was stored on a magnetic stripe that could easily be read and
counterfeited. is vulnerability was quickly exploited by criminals [30]. Embedded
CHIP & PIN cards replaced magnetic stripes to prevent counterfeiting, thus reducing
fraud2.
In 2008, contactless cards, also referred to as Near Field Communication (NFC)
cards, emerged in the UK [23]. ese could be used to pay for purchases with a mere
tap on the terminal, without entering a PIN. Although they undeniably enhanced con-
venience, they also heightened the risk of fraud. ose who carry a card requiring a
PIN risk losing money only if both the card and PIN are stolen. However, if someone
steals or nds a contactless card, they can use it at a POS without a PIN for transactions
under a specic threshold.
1 hp://www.theukcardsassociation.org.uk/history of cards/index.asp
2 hp://www.theukcardsassociation.org.uk/news/10yearsChipandPINnews.asp
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e contactless limits are dierent across the world. In the UK, it is £30 and in
Germany it is €25 while in the USA it is $1003. Note that these limits were in place be-
fore the UK COVID-19 pandemic lockdown, during which the contactless transaction
limits were adjusted upwards.
Contactless payments oer people the maximum amount of convenience at the
POS where transaction amounts are small. In 2016, Jones [14] reported that the average
transaction in the UK was under £10, which appears to be a good match for contactless
payments.
What about the risks? Jones [14] reported on research by the Nationwide Building
Society, which found that in 2016 more than half of UK citizens were “wary” of the new
contactless payment cards. ey reported on people wrapping their cards in tinfoil to
prevent fraudsters from taking payments from their pockets. Yet in 2019, de Best [5]
reported that 46% of point of sale (POS) transactions in the UK were contactless. UK
citizens had clearly become less worried in the interim.
Financial Fraud Action UK [11] notes that fraud on contactless cards and devices
remains low, equivalent to 2.7p in every £100 spent using contactless technology, ac-
counting for only 1% of overall card fraud.
The Real Risks: According to article 73 of the PSD2 [10], the payment service
provider is liable for all unauthorised transactions. In combination with article 74, the
payer’s liability for unauthorised payment transactions can be a maximum of €50, or
approximately £50. Even so, banks have introduced a less secure contactless system,
which makes it harder to detect unauthorised transactions.
e everyday consumer might well not be aware of the regulations, but UK con-
sumer rights group “Which”, a trusted source of advice, published the outcome of their
own investigation into contactless cards in the UK. eir ndings can be summarised
as follows [32]:
Customer Perceptions: 73% liked the convenience aorded by contactless cards
but 69% were worried about the cards being stolen.
Liability: banks say they will refund fraudulent purchases, but they found cases
where refunds were delayed or refused. e onus is on the bank to prove negligence
and they are obliged to refund if they cannot do this. Customers can contact the nan-
cial ombudsman if their bank refuses to refund contested transactions.
Severity per Transaction: e transaction limit during this study was £30.
Opt Out: ey provide a list of contactless card providers in the UK, and at least
six did not allow customers to opt out of using these cards at time of writing.
Which’s report provides an excellent overview of the actual liability and severity
related to contactless payments. e question is whether the millions of UK contactless
card users are aware of these facts.
3 Methodology
We carried out a mixed-methods study, as detailed below, because we were seeking
to reveal insights. As such, we were not aiming to demonstrate signicant statistical
3 hps://merchantmachine.co.uk/contactless-limits/
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dierences, only to reveal risk perceptions and knowledge of such risk parameters by
UK contactless card users.
3.1 Researchestions
Our overall goal is to reveal people’s mental models related to contactless debit card
risk perception in the UK. To do so, we derived the following three research questions:
RQ1: Liability: Who does the contactless cardholder think is liable if a thief steals
a card and uses it?
RQ2: Severity: How severe does the contactless cardholder perceive the conse-
quences of card the to be?
RQ3: Likelihood: How likely does the contactless cardholder perceive the risk of
a thief stealing their card and using it to be?
3.2 Study Procedure
We conducted an online survey, with six sections (Figure 2), to explore UK citizen
mental models. e survey was created with SoSci Survey.
Fig. 2. Study Procedure
1. Consent & Introduction: We obtained informed consent and presented general
information. Participants were informed that they were only permied to participate
if they had a bank account and paid for goods contactlessly with their debit cards.
2. Scenario: Participants were presented with a contactless card fraud scenario. We
specically chose a scenario where negligence was not a contributing factor. It is thus
necessary for the victim to be unaware of the card the and subsequent fraud. Hence
the scenario makes it clear that there was no opportunity for the victim to report the
the and thereby prevent subsequent fraudulent use of their card.
Mister A. is walking down a street when a stranger approaches him and asks for di-
rections. Later that day Mister A. realises that his purse went missing. He realises that he
was pickpocketed by the stranger asking for directions. Mister A. goes to his bank and sees
that the fraudster has used his card several times to make purchases, using the contactless
payment option and staying below the limit, so that he does not need to enter the PIN.
3. Liabilityestions:
We asked participants to provide an open text response:
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– Who would be liable in the scenario above? Open text response.
Liability Experience estions:
To assess personal or vicarious experience, we also asked a number of questions (rea-
soning that such experience might have made them aware of actual liability). We asked
them to select one of the options for each question.
– Has something like this ever happened to you? Yes/ No/ Don’t know.
– Has something like this ever happened to someone close to you? Yes/ No/ Don’t
know.
– Has something like this ever happened to an acquaintance? Yes/ No/ Don’t know.
4. Severityestions:
ese questions focused on the potential severity related to the scenario. e questions
related to severity were modied from a study by McClenahan et al. [18]. Severity
questionnaires can be found in many academic disciplines, but most commonly in
health studies [21]. Miles [21] refers to the survey formulated by Champion [7], which
introduced the questions that we used for our study and those that the McClenahan
et al. study [18] is based on. Not all of the questions are strictly tied to severity (pure
severity questions are marked with an *). e other questions measure fear, which is
part of assessing the severity of the consequences. ese models are also connected to
protection motivation theory, which we refer to in our discussion.
We modied the questions for our context and presented them to the respondents
in random order. For instance, the original question was “e thought of testicular can-
cer scares me”. We changed the specic reference to testicular cancer to “the scenario
happening to me”. We made the same changes for each question, respectively. e op-
tions ranged from strong disagreement to strong agreement on a seven-point Likert
scale [16].
– e thought of the scenario happening to me, scares me.
– When I think about this scenario happening to me, I feel nauseous.
– If this scenario happened to me, my career would be endangered.*
– When I think about this scenario, my heart beats faster.
– is scenario happening to me, would endanger my marriage (or signicant rela-
tionship).*
– is scenario happening to me, would leave me hopeless. *
– My feelings about myself would change if I would experience the mentioned sce-
nario.*
– My nancial security would be endangered if the scenario would happen to me.*
– I am afraid to even think about the mentioned scenario.
– Problems I would experience by such a scenario would last a long time.
– If I experienced such a scenario, it be more serious than other events.*
– If I had experienced such a scenario, my whole life would change.*
Severity Knowledge estions:
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We included two questions to assess knowledge of the actual severity. ese could be
answered by choosing an option and providing an open text response.
– Do you know how much money Mister A. could lose in the given scenario? Yes, it
is: open text / No, but I guess it is: open text.
– Do you know how much you can spend per contactless transaction with your
contactless debit card, without entering your PIN? Yes, it is: open text/ No, but I
guess it is: open text.
5. Likelihoodestions:
We asked the participants questions related to the perceived likelihood of the scenario
occurring. ese questions were inspired by Brugger et al. [6], who introduced the
concept of psychological distance to study likelihood perception. When looking into
the literature regarding likelihood, several questionnaires exist but most of them are
very specic to their own contexts. We thus chose a broader concept that can be ap-
plied to our context. We could have also chosen to ask a simple question to explore
how likely they felt it was that the event could happen to them. With the current
approach, we aempted to gain insights into multiple factors that would inuence
their likelihood calculus. Once again, we adapted their questions our context. For in-
stance,the third question, “To me, climate change feels like tomorrow…like thousands of
years away” was changed to “it could happen to me tomorrow…couple years from now”.
ese changes resulted in the following questions:
– To me, the mentioned scenario feels: very close (le) … very distant (right).
– To me, the mentioned scenario feels as if it could happen : here (le) … at the other
end of the world (right).
– To me, the mentioned scenario feels like it could happen to me: tomorrow (le) …
couple years from now (right).
– To me, the mentioned scenario feels like it could aect me: (le) … aecting distant
strangers (right).
– To me, the mentioned scenario feels: very real (le) … very hypothetical (right).
Aention Check:
We included the following question to this list as an aention check:
• is question will test your aention. Please tick the second answer from the right.
Participants who failed the test were redirected to the end of the survey and no
payment was given. Note that this was explicitly stated in the survey introduction
(Survey Section 1).
Participants responded on a seven-point scale. e questions were presented in
random order to minimise ordering eects.
6. Demographics and Thanks:
e questionnaire concluded with demographic questions (gender, age range). We con-
cluded by providing a code so that they could claim their remuneration, and thanked
them.
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3.3 Analysis, Ethics & Recruitment
e quantitative data was analysed descriptively using SPSS statistics soware. For
the qualitative part, we used open coding. Two researchers read through the answers
and created codes independently. Aerwards, one codebook was jointly created, and
then used by both researchers to code all of the answers. e researchers achieved an
inter rater reliability of κ = .80, which can be interpreted as strong agreement, accord-
ing to [8, 19].
Ethics. We informed participants that their responses would be published anony-
mously, so that individual respondents could not be identied. We also informed them
that their answers might be quoted in subsequent publications. We also explicitly
stated that, to be remunerated, the participants had to answer the aention question
correctly and that they had to engage in using contactless payments in their every-
day lives. ey were given the opportunity to exit the survey at any time without any
negative consequences. e SoSci service is GDPR compliant and therefore conforms
to the requirements of the University of [Anonymised]’s ethical commission.
Recruitment. We recruited participants from the UK via Clickworker’s participant
panel, commencing on 11.11.2019 and terminating on 30.11.2019. Having piloting the
survey, we expected the participants to complete it in 15 minutes. erefore, partici-
pants received €2.40 which corresponded to 1/4 of the UK minimum wage in 2019.
4 Results
In this section, we introduce the codes, as well as their frequencies, and the responses
to all the questions asked in the survey. Finally, we explore further aspects that might
have inuenced the given answers.
4.1 Demographics
A total of 56 participants completed the survey. We excluded 11 participants from
further analysis: three because of obvious nonsense answers, two because they had
never used contactless debit cards, and six because they did not answer the aention
question correctly. Of the remaining 45, 24 were male and 21 female. Age ranges were
21 under 35s, 10 between 35 and 45, and 15 over 45s.
Table 1. Coded answers to the question, “Who would be liable in the scenario?”
Code # %
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4.2 Codes and Total Responses
e rst question asked participants whether they had experienced an incident such
as the one described in the scenario, or whether it had happened to someone close to
them or to an acquaintance. Two of the 45 participants had fallen victim to such an
incident. Twelve participants knew someone close to them who had been a victim of
such a fraud, and three knew it had happened to an acquaintance. Altogether this had
happened to a total of 14 people. Note that we only counted people once, even if they
knew of victims in multiple categories.
For the question related to who is liable, we created four dierent codes, ‘Mr. A/me’,
‘e Bank’ or ‘e Stranger’. Note that for the code ‘Mr. A’, we also counted everyone
saying me, because a few participants imagined being in the scenario, even though we
did not ask them to. We coded an answer to a certain category if the answer contained
the code itself, or any variation thereof. Examples of how answers were coded:
– ‘Mr. A/ Me’: Mr A., You individually.
– ‘Bank’: e banks would be liable, e bank.
– ‘Stranger’: ief, e person who took the card.
Severity and likelihood were measured using multiple scale questions. To support
comparison, we computed the average of all the answers, as suggested by [18]. e
participants rated the severity with a mean score of 3.38 and a SD of 1.2. Note that ‘1’
is trivial and ‘7’ is extremely severe. e mean score for likelihood was 5.17 with a SD
of 1.37. Note that we use the inverse value to enhance readability, meaning that ‘7’
maps to highly likely and ‘1’ maps to unlikely.
e participants were asked if they knew how much they could spend with each
contactless transaction without having to enter their PIN. 33 participants said they
knew and 12 guessed. We coded the answer using three codes, either ‘Exactly £30’,
‘More than £30’ or ‘Less than £30’. ese were chosen to be either the correct contactless
transaction amount, more or less than the amount. e answers were all provided in
numerical format. In the following, we provide some examples of each of the codes.
– ‘£30’: £30 max, £30
– ‘More than’: £40, £250
– ‘Less than’: £20-£25, £20
All 33 participants who said they knew the answer gave the correct answer of £30.
Seven of the 12 participants who guessed the answer also gave the correct answer.
Only two guessed more than £30 and 3 less than £30.
e participants were asked how much Mr A might lose in the given scenario.
We created eight codes for this question, more than £135, full amount on card, up
to a specic limit, less than £135, up to £30 per transaction, nothing, and other/NA.
According to the PSD2, aer ve contactles payments or cumulative £135 the bank
has to prove the owner of the card by asking for a PIN. We asked them if they knew
the answer or needed to guess. Twelve participants said they knew the answer and 33
guessed. Here, we provide some examples of each of the codes:
– ‘Full amount’: All the money in his bank account., All his money
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Table 2.Coded answers to the question, “Do you know how much you can spend per contactless
transaction with your contactless Debit Card, without entering your PIN?”
Code Know the Answer % Guess the Answer %
£30 33 100 7 58.3
More than - - 2 16.7
Less than - - 3 25
– ‘Up to a specic limit’: A proportion of his balance up to certain limit, maybe 25%
– ‘More than £135’: £300? Is there a daily limit on contactless payments?, A few
hundred pounds.
– ‘Less than £135’: £100, £30
– ‘Up to £30 per transaction’: £30 per transaction, Any amount of transaction under
30
– ‘Nothing’: 0
– ‘Other/NA’: e amount stolen
Table 3. Coded answers to the question, “Do you know how much money Mr A. could lose in
the given scenario?”
Code Know the Answer % Guess the Answer %
Full amount - - 1 3
Up to a specic limit 1 8.3 2 6.1
More than £135 2 16.7 11 33.3
Less than £135 1 8.3 14 42.4
Up to £30 per transaction 5 41.6 2 6.1
Nothing 3 25 2 6.1
Other/NA - - 1 3
With respect to severity, 20 participants estimated the loss as being less than the
actual limit of £135 and 24 estimated an amount over the actual limit. To calculate these
numbers, we allocated the code ‘nothing’ to “less than the limit” and “full amount”, cer-
tain amount, and up to £30 per transaction to ‘more than the limit’.
We explored the inuence of answers to specic questions, e.g. who is liable on
the one hand, to estimated likelihood and severity, on the other.
4.3 Impact of Experience:
Experiencing an incident ought to inuence likelihood perceptions. 31 of the 45 par-
ticipants had never heard of, nor experienced, such an incident, while 14 had. We see
a dierence in severity ratings for each of these groups.
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No Experience: Participants who had not experienced the scenario, either person-
ally or vicariously, had a mean score of 3.19 for severity and a mean score of 5.04 for
likelihood.
Had Experience: ose who had had personal or vicarious experience had a mean
score of 3.73 for severity and a mean score of 5.46 on likelihood. is shows that a lived
fraud experience leads to an increased estimation of likelihood as well as severity.
4.4 Impact of Liability Attribution:
e next aspect to explore is liability aribution. We had three groups to distinguish
(1) ‘Bank’, (2) ‘Mr. A/me’, and (3) ‘e stranger’.
– Bank: e mean score for severity was 2.85 and for likelihood 5.3.
– Mr A./me: e mean score for severity was 3.53 with a mean likelihood score of
5.12.
– Stranger: e mean scores were 4.15 for severity and 4.88 for likelihood.
In summary, participants who thought ‘e Bank’ was liable estimated the lowest
severity, followed by ‘Mr. A/me’, and then by ‘e Stranger’. e likelihood estimation
slopes in the same direction.
Considering the inuence of liability aribution, we again distinguished between
three categories: (1) ‘more than the actual limit’ (>£135), ‘less than the limit’ (<£135) ,
or ‘the actual limit’ (£135). See Table 4.
Table 4. Coded answers for “Who is liable and how much can Mr A. lose in the presented
scenario?”







Bank 8 8 1 17
Mr A/me 8 5 1 14
Stranger 7 4 - 12
Other/NA 1 1 - 2
Finally, we considered liability aribution and separated participants based on di-
rect or vicarious experience of such an incident. e results show that the severity,
for each of the liability aributions, is higher for those with experience than for the
uninitiated. Interestingly, those who fell into the group that aributed liability to the
bank, and had had no experience of such a scenario, estimated the scenario as being
most likely to occur. See Table 5.
5 Discussion
We can now return to our three research questions:
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Table 5. Coded answers for who is liable and if ever heard/experienced such a scenario or not
Who is Liable Heard/experienced incident Not heard/experienced incident# Severity Likelihood # Severity Likelihood
Bank 7 3.30 6.26 11 2.57 4.69
Mr A./me 2 4.04 3.90 13 3.45 5.31
Stranger 5 4.2 4.60 5 4.1 4.80
Other/NA - - - 2 2.67 5.80
RQ1: Liability: Who does the contactless cardholder think is liable if a thief steals a
card and uses it?
We discovered that 60% of the participants did not realise that the bank was liable
for contested transactions. e general lack of awareness we detected is benecial to
banks because if people assume they cannot challenge transactions, they will accept
the liability, and they will do so seemingly for large amounts of money. Are banks
telling their customers that they are not liable for fraudulent contactless transactions?
We visited the corporate nance institute to nd the names of the top banks in the
UK4. For each bank we did a Google search on 31 March 2020 for contactless card fraud
appended to the bank’s name. We then visited each of these banks to ascertain whether
they did indeed provide accurate information related to liability. Table 6 shows what
we discovered.
Table 6. UK Banks’ Information about Contactless Liability
Bank URL Liability
Bank of Scotland bankofscotland.co.uk Bank is liable
Barclays barclays.co.uk Bank is liable
HSBC —




Santander www.santander.co.uk Fraud protection is the same as for
Chip&PIN
e UK Card Association [29] explains that “You are fully protected against fraud,
so you get all of your money back and will never be le out of pocket.” With respect
to the amount a person can spend without entering a PIN, they say “Every card has
an in-built security check which means from time-to-time you have to enter your PIN to
verify that you are the genuine cardholder.”
Only two of the banks provide accurate information. e others either say that
people have the same protection as for CHIP & PIN cards or require people to contact
the bank to report fraud (so that they do not admit that they are liable for contactless
4 hps://corporatenanceinstitute.com/resources/careers/companies/top-banks-in-the-uk/
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card fraud).
RQ2: Severity: How severe does the contactless cardholder perceive the consequences of
card the to be?
88.9% of the participants knew how much they can spend per transaction, but were
not aware of the limit of £135, which is encoded in article 42 of the PSD2 regulations.
We expected participants to rate the incident as being less severe when the bank is li-
able, which was conrmed by our ndings. Interestingly enough, the highest severity
score was achieved by participants stating that the stranger would be liable. is nd-
ing might be explained by the uncertainty that comes with the stranger being liable. It
might be nearly impossible to apprehend the stranger, and Mr. A might need to write
o his losses.
RQ3: Likelihood: How likely does the contactless cardholder perceive the risk of a thief
stealing their card and using it to be?
Participants rated the scenario at least likely if they thought a stranger would be
liable. ey rated severity lowest when the bank would be liable. is makes sense,
because they personally would not lose anything, except for the eort involved in
reporting the incident. We have to ask why the severity is not highest when Mr. A is
liable? e participants might believe that it is Mr. A’s own fault and that he should
accept the consequences.
We can now explore some possible explanations for the mental models perception
we revealed.
5.1 Possible Explanations
e mental models we uncovered are not due to a lack of information being oered
by banks or consumer rights organisations. e conclusion we have to make is that
people are not looking for the information. ey are using the contactless cards with-
out really being aware of the risks related to their use. ere are a number of possible
explanations for this.
Optimism Bias: Van Pligt [24] highlighted a general human tendency to underesti-
mate risk, especially with respect to the impact on yourself. Moreover, our perception
of risk is based on severity and likelihood, the intention being to avoid loss as much as
possible. at means that, to minimize the sense of loss, people might underestimate
the potential losses that might result from an adverse event. Doing this would help
them to justify their usage of a system that they believe to be more risky given that
they consider themselves to be liable for any associated losses.
Focus on Reward: Protection Motivation eory [22] suggests that people weigh
up likelihood and severity, on the one hand, against rewards, on the other, to make a
threat appraisal. Our study suggests that reward (convenience) is greater than partic-
ipants’ perceptions of severity and liability. If people are aware of the fact that banks
UK Citizens’ Perceptions of Contactless Card Risks 13
are indeed willing to refund them, then severity will never be an issue. At the mo-
ment, based on the responses, likelihood perceptions are not high either. It might be
that the small amount of money spent in each contactless transaction leads them to
discount the risk. at being so, the anticipated reward becomes far more salient than
the perceived unlikely liability.
Avoidance: People might be engaging in avoidance behaviour, i.e. fear control rather
than danger control [26]. If this is happening, it means that they prefer not to think
about the risks because it makes them feel uncomfortable. is might explain why
people don’t make any eort to nd out about personal liability. is might dovetail
with Zipf’s [33] suggestion that people will choose the path of least resistance i.e.
minimising eort.
Social Conformance: ere might be an element of social conformance [27]. People
might think that “everyone else is happily using these cards, so it must be ok”. is was
found to be a predictor of non-protective behaviour in another study [31] and might
also be the case here. A variety of dierent ways of paying contactlessly are emerging
(e.g. Apple Pay) and their diusion might be convincing people that the risks must be
acceptable.
5.2 In Summary
It is unlikely that one of these explanations, in isolation, explains what we observed.
ere are probably elements of these that come together, and each respondent will be
inuenced to dierent degrees. We are aware of both the positive and possible negative
consequences of making the costumers more aware of their rights. Still, we argue as
it is their right, they should know about it and get the information in an easy and
understandable manner.
5.3 Consequences
Banks might have poor motivation to ensure that the contactless card usage liability
is clear. Without clarity, customers might be less interested in asking for a refund for
contested transactions, especially since the amount is likely to be to small in compari-
son to the required eort to make a claim. is might change if banks were to state the
zero liability legislation. On the other hand, this might well encourage customers to
engage in fraudulent behaviors by claiming refunds for non-fraudulent transactions.
It is indeed possible for customers to abuse their rights to claim refunds. However,
banks have improved their fraud detection systems over the last few years to prevent
such fraudulent actions. is means that the risks of such behaviors, in comparison to
the prots, are relatively low. Another side eect of more accurate liability knowledge
might be that the customers would exercise less care to secure their cards, as they know
any contested transactions will be refunded. Even so, we argue that the eort required
to get a new card and reporting anomalous incidents is currently too high. If incidents
of stolen debit cards increase it is likely that banks would engage in more intensive
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investigations when people aempt to claim for contested transactions. ey might
well be biased in favour of claiming gross negligence instead of refunding money as
the legislation mandates.
5.4 Limitations:
ere are a number of limitations in this study. e rst is the small number of par-
ticipants. is made it impossible for us to carry out statistical analyses of the results.
Yet we did gain valuable insights from our qualitative analysis. e second limitation
is that we only surveyed UK participants. is was a deliberate choice because we
wanted to maximise our chances of geing enough participants for our study, and the
UK is a major user of contactless payment cards.
6 Related Literature
A number of changes are occuring in the European nancial landscape, due to the
introduction of PSD2, which further strengthens customer rights related to dierent
payment methods. Steenot [28] reviewed changes relating to liability and concluded
that liability has been reduced, especially in cases of payments that do not require
strong authentication. Strong, in this case, refers to the need for two factor authen-
tication. is will not only change online shopping, but also the liability related to
unauthorised contactless transactions, because no second factor is required.
is situation will create more competition and leave the banks to respond. Cortet
et al. [9] suggest four possible strategies to react to this situation: (1) comply, (2) com-
pete, (3) expand, and (4) transform. Whichever way, it will inuence the nancial land-
scape. It is important to keep customers’ trust during this period of change. e intro-
duction of new payment systems such as the contactless one clearly provide greater
levels of convenience but might also trigger suspicion. Polasik et al. [25] demonstrated
that contactless payment is faster than any other payment methods and people do in-
deed favour convenience.
Lumpkins and Joyce [17] and Akinyokun and Teague [1] explored NFC systems
that enable the transfer of money. Lumpkins and Joyce [17] created a collection of
payment methods, what they are and how they work. eir opinion is that NFC is the
next step into the future and will eliminate paper currency and plastic credit cards. e
ultimate goal of rolling out this new method, based on these papers, is the eventual
replacement of hard cash across society. It is likely that this will be pushed even harder
now that COVID-19 related concerns are discouraging the use of cash5.
An interesting study by Bre [3] investigated how the adoption of contactless pay-
ment aects and their impact on our spending behaviours. e main ndings were a
reduced sense of guilt and more purchases of smaller goods, as it is easier to pay for
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Research has also been undertaken to investigate making the method more secure
by exploring further ideas for verication [2, 12]. Alhothaily et al. [2] introduced a new
verication method for cardholder by using a multi possession-factor authentication
with an integrated distance bounding technique. is adds an additionallayer of secu-
rity and prevents many dierent aacks. Gunson et al. [12] studied the perception of
single and two-factor authentication methods in automated telephone banking. ey
used a one-time pass code generated using a hardware security token to add additional
security level. e user perceived the two-factor authentication as more secure, but,
on the downside, the usability reduced.
Akinyokun et al. [2] analysed NFC-enabled mobile wallets and contactless pay-
ment cards and also explored the EMV and ISO standards for contactless payments.
eir examination highlighted inconsistencies between the two standards which, in
their words, are disconcerting and might compromise the integrity of contactless trans-
action payments.
We were not able to nd any other studies into the mental models of those who
use contactless payment systems.
7 Conclusion
Contactless payments are the ultimate convenience in daily shopping — allowing a
shopper to pay with a tap of a card. Yet it also seems risky because the holder of
the card does not necessarily need to be the owner of the bank account. Cards get
misplaced and stolen, and contactless cards appear, at rst, to be the thief’s greatest
enabler. However, this has been anticipated and the latest legislation forces banks to
accept liability when fraudulent transactions occur.
We carried out this research to determine whether UK citizens, as one of the coun-
tries with the longest history of contactless card usage, are aware of their zero liability
in this respect. We discovered that there was generally a low level of awareness of who
carried the liability for fraudulent transactions. It seems that people will use contact-
less cards, even if they think they themselves are liable if other people use their cards
to defraud them.
We suggest a few explanations for our ndings. We believe that consumer rights
organisations in all countries where PSD2 applies ought to do more to highlight the
actual liability aribution so that customers are more aware of their rights and can
claim the money from their banks if they are defrauded.
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